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theless, owing to Brentano's extraordinary clearness with regard to the precise relevance of all he says, the contents of the book are far more easy to grasp than is usual with books of the most regular form: there seems no reason to wish that he had arranged his matter differently.

The translation is not well done; and it should be noticed that the cross-references are often utterly wrong, *e. g.*, on p. 47, where we are referred to note 27, p. 83 sub., the reference should apparently be to p. 73 sub.; on p. 82, *for* note 26, p. 77 *read* p. 71; on p. 87, *for* note 43, p. 99 *read* note 44, p. 92; on p. 89, *for* note 31, p. 91 *read* note 32, p. 85; and in the notes (pp. 87-90), the notes numbered 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42 should be numbered respectively 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43.

G. E. MOORE.

TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE.

A STUDY IN THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ETHICS. By David Irons, M. A. (St. Andrews), Ph. D. (Cornell), Associate Professor of Bryn Mawr College. Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood & Sons. 1903. Pp. xviii, 176.

This book has the merit of calling attention to two facts which are far too frequently neglected.

The first of these is the fact that emotions have to their objects a peculiar kind of relation which cannot be identified either with that of a cognition to its object, or with that of effect to cause. Fear of a lion is not identical with a cognition of the lion accompanied by a feeling of fear; for I am not afraid of everything which I cognise at any moment when I am afraid. And similarly when I think that I am angry with my brother, *what* I think of is plainly quite a different thing from that which I think of when I think that my brother, or the idea of him, causes my feeling of anger. Mr. Irons does well to point out that for this, as well as for other reasons, such a definition of emotion as Höffding's is ridiculous (pp. 9-10).

The second fact is that our emotions directly influence our actions. This fact has not, like the last, been almost universally neglected; but it directly contradicts the very common theory that pleasure and pain are the sole psychological causes of action—a theory which it is one of Mr. Iron's main objects to attack. It should be noted, however, that Mr. Irons is not careful to distinguish the two

theories (a) that a present pleasure, and (b) that the idea of a future pleasure is the sole cause of action; or to distinguish the theory that pleasure or pain are, in one of these two senses, necessary conditions of all action, from the theory that they are its sole cause.

But unfortunately Mr. Irons seems to regard as standing or falling with these two facts, three other principles, which are in fact quite independent of them, and against which the strongest objections may be urged.

(1) He seems to regard the peculiar relation of an emotion to its object as identical with "*reaction* in reference to" that object (p. 7). He explains that he does not mean by this merely that the emotion is a joint product of the cognition of the object and of the previous state of "the psychical organism:" this, which is certainly true, he admits to be true of pleasure also; whereas he takes the fact that emotion is "subjectivity as *reaction*" to distinguish it from pleasure which is "subjectivity as *receptivity*." In what other sense then, is emotion a "reaction"? Having a thing is certainly not *identical* with acting upon it in any kind of way; and Mr. Irons even appears to admit this. But, if so, we must conclude that to call the relation of an emotion to its object, a relation of "reaction" is merely misleading.

(2) Mr. Irons is anxious to insist that emotion is an "ultimate aspect of mind," different in kind not only from cognition, but also from "pleasure-pain" and conation (p. xvii). He proposes to distinguish it from "pleasure-pain," as we have just seen, by maintaining that it has, and "pleasure-pain" has not, an "outward reference." By this "outward reference" is meant that peculiar relation of an emotion to its object, which as was pointed out above, is not identical with that of cognition to its object, but is also not, as Mr. Irons thinks, identical with "the outward direction which is characteristic of all reaction" (p. 10). But Mr. Irons fails, I think, to establish that emotion is distinguished from pleasure-pain by this "outward reference." It seems on the contrary: (a) That pleasure-pain *may* have precisely the same "outward reference;" when I am *pleased with* a person, it would seem that the relation of my feeling to him is exactly the same as when I am *angry with* him. (b) That emotion *may* exist *without* this "objective reference:" there is as much reason to think that we sometimes feel afraid without being afraid *of* anything, as to think that we are sometimes in pain without being pained *at* anything.

Similarly Mr. Irons fails to show that the relation of conative states, *e. g.*, desire, to their object is not, as Brentano maintains, of precisely the same kind as that of an emotion to its object. Accordingly, if we are to define emotion, as Mr. Irons proposes, as "feeling-attitude," *i. e.*, by the fact that it sometimes has this peculiar "outward reference," it would appear that pleasure-pain and conation are to be classed as emotions. That emotions differ qualitatively both from one another, and from pleasure or pain or any form of "conation" Mr. Irons is, of course, quite right to insist; and even this elementary fact is, as he points out, constantly neglected. But it does not follow (as Mr. Irons might suggest, *e. g.*, pp. xvi, 39) that each qualitatively different emotion is "unanalyzable; and their qualitative difference would give to conation and pleasure-pain no more right to be considered different "*ultimate* aspects of mind," than the difference between fear and love gives to these emotions, or the difference between the cognition of red and the cognition of causality to these cognitions. In short, instead of *four* Mr. Irons has established but *two* "ultimate aspects of mind," namely the *relation* of cognition to its object, and the *relation* of emotion to its object.

(3) Mr. Irons holds that "every emotion presupposes a judgment by means of which the situation is brought under a general category" (p. xvi). He gives no conclusive evidence for this assumption; it seems to be contradicted by introspection; and, if it were true, it would probably follow that animals can have no emotions. But, moreover, when he proceeds to point out what are the judgments which he takes to be the necessary conditions of particular emotions, it seems plain that many of these supposed judgments themselves either are or include emotions. A man, he says, "is angry because he *objects to* being pained" (p. 78); and similarly "the necessary conditions of ill-feeling are present whenever the object is regarded as the source of effects which are *felt as objectionable*" (p. 88). It seems plain, that, in the cases here referred to, what is meant by "objecting to" a thing, or "feeling it as objectionable," is itself an emotion, and similarly any "sense of danger," which may be plausibly regarded as a necessary condition of fear (p. 15), would seem certainly to be itself an emotion. It is purely extravagant to maintain that a rabbit cannot be afraid until he has been conscious "that an evil is possible which possibly he cannot cope with" (p. 84). These instances certainly do not support Mr. Irons' contention that a judgment is a necessary condition of every emotion.

To establish these principles with regard to the emotions seems to be the main object of Mr. Irons' first three chapters; of which Chap. I discusses "The Nature of Emotion," Chap. II criticises "Current Theories of Emotion," and Chap. III gives an account of the particular emotions. But these chapters also contain a great mass of detail, somewhat loosely put together, which is often interesting, but rarely convincing, and which does not generally seem to have any confirmatory bearing upon the above principles, even when Mr. Irons supposes it to have one.

But with Chapters IV and V we pass to what Mr. Irons describes as "The general problem which is the subject of this inquiry" (p. xviii)—the discovery, namely of "the primary tendencies of the psychical organism," "the primary principles of activity." With regard to these tendencies Mr. Irons' two main contentions are (1) that they are necessary conditions of emotion and (2) that they are *not* hedonic; so that our activities may be divided into three different classes (1) actions caused by emotion, (2) actions caused by "pleasure-pain," and (3) actions of which the principle is one of these "primary principles of activity."

These chapters are unsatisfactory chiefly because Mr. Irons has not been at pains to consider what he means by "tendencies to action," and in what relation they stand to the conceptions by which he classifies them. For instance, he tells us that one of our primary tendencies is "the impulse to self-preservation" (p. 132). Does he here mean by "impulse" *any* course of action which *results* in self-preservation, or does he only mean a *conscious* impulse—one in which there is present some cognition of an object towards which the impulse is directed? What he says about the influence of knowledge on action (pp. 138-145) strictly implies that no cognition is ever a constituent of a primary impulse: he does not appear to have realized that "striving after" a thing can only properly denote a mental attitude towards a cognized object. Yet if his "primary impulses" are all purely unconscious, it is plain that to establish their existence does not, as he thinks, contradict the theory that cognition of pleasure and pain are the only cognitions which do influence action. But if he does mean by "impulse" "conscious impulse," does he mean by "the impulse to self-preservation," only the single impulse defined as that in which the actual idea of self-preservation helps to cause action; or does he mean the immense variety of *different* impulses, in each of which some *different* cognition is the motive idea, and which

have in common only the fact that they all *result* in self-preservation? If he means the former, then his "primary tendencies" certainly constitute only a *very* small part of our actual tendencies, and emotions can certainly arise before they exist; if he means the latter, then it is important to observe that what he calls a single tendency is in fact a vast number of different tendencies, and that to call them all by a single name, which is merely the name of a result which they generally produce, is more misleading than useful.

We may, then, agree with Mr. Irons that a vast number of ideas other than those of pleasure and pain are conditions of action—that we strive after a great many objects beside pleasure. But the relation of the activities thus caused to the emotions is not so clear. If, as we saw, Mr. Irons has failed to show that *any* judgment is a necessary condition of emotion, far less has he shown that "the consciousness of the relation in which objects stand to [some one] of [our] tendencies" (p. xvi) is such a necessary condition. The "*recognition*" that an object "*interests*" us (p. 109) is certainly not necessary to emotion. And to say that we do not feel emotion towards an object unless it *does* interest us may only mean either that we do not feel an emotion towards it unless we do feel an emotion towards it (for interest properly denotes an emotion), or that we do not feel an emotion towards it unless the idea of it often helps to cause some action. Both propositions are true, but neither of them establishes the proposition which is essential to Mr. Irons' point: namely, that it is only because some ideas help to cause action *without* exciting emotions, that we ever come to feel any emotions at all.

Mr. Irons' last chapter is on "The Ideal of Worth as Regulative Principle." He maintains that every man has an Ideal of Worth which does influence his actions; and so far, I think, we may follow him, at least as regards civilized men. But he also apparently intends to maintain that this Ideal *ought* to regulate *all* his actions; and that it consists in the "realization of his distinctive nature" (pp. 159, 171). Moreover he seems to think that these two propositions follow, in some way, from the first. It seemed only necessary to point out: (1) That a man may *have* an Ideal of Worth, which is very far from *being* an Ideal of Worth—in plain words, that he may *think* a thing good, which is very far from being so: and that, even where a man's ideas of what is good are not erroneous, it is often not possible, and, where possi-

ble, often not desirable; that they should influence *all* his actions. (2) That different men have different ideals of worth, and even each man, in general, a great many different ideals. That the realization of all of these would in each case be identical with the "restoration of the individual's distinctive nature," certainly require more proof than Mr. Irons offers. (3) That, even if a man's ideal of worth were the "realization of his distinctive nature"—even if he did think this realization a good thing, he would be mistaken. For all men (I believe) have some "distinctive capacities" (p. 159) for evil; and all men certainly have some capacities which it is desirable they should not realize.

G. E. MOORE.

TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE.

THE ORIGIN AND PROPAGATION OF SIN; being the Hulsean Lectures delivered before the University of Cambridge, in 1901-2, by F. R. Tennant, M. A. (Camb.), B. Sc. (Lond.), Student of Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge. Cambridge: The University Press. Pp. xv, 231.

This is a most interesting and valuable contribution towards that Metaphysics of Theology of which we want so much and get so little. The place of sin in the universe is important enough, and its place in Christian doctrine is perhaps even more prominent. Mr. Tennant could scarcely have taken a subject so much in need of intelligent treatment, and the result of his labors has justified his choice.

The first lecture deals with the views on the subject which have been held by professed theologians. Mr. Tennant begins by pointing out that the fact of the existence of sin—which cannot be denied—must not be confused with the truth of the theory of Original Sin—which is only one of various possible ways of accounting for the fact (p. 9). It is also to be noticed that, while the denial of the need of grace would involve disbelief in the Fall, yet disbelief in the Fall need not involve the denial of the need of grace. (p. 13). The difficulties involved in the conception of the Fall are then discussed, and the lecture concludes with an examination of the possibility of the transmission of corruption from Adam to his descendants. Then I am inclined to think the author goes too far in saying that heredity, in any strict sense, can only appertain to the rational side of our constitution—unless in-